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Abstract: Conditional cash transfer programs have been widely deployed across the globe. 
They seek to bolster human capital by providing benefits contingent upon a variety of actions 
such as school attendance and regular health checkups. Bolsa Familia is the most extensive 
conditional cash transfer program, serving 46 million Brazilian citizens. Despite its expansive 
size, there have been seldom large-scale micro evaluations of the program. Limited data has 
resulted in small sample sizes drawn from a single point in time. Our study diverges from the 
rest and utilizes a novel administrative dataset with an overall sample of nearly 60 million and 
a period of four years. We first examine the impact that Bolsa Familia has on school 
enrollment by establishing a baseline relationship via a fixed effect linear probability model. 
Then, we utilize fuzzy regression discontinuity approach that evaluates the school outcomes 
of families right above and below the income threshold. Initial linear probability regressions 
find that Bolsa Familia consistently reduces the risk of a child not being in school by around 
11% for those currently enrolled. Our fuzzy regression discontinuity approach amplifies these 
results, suggesting that Bolsa Familia leads to a 53% reduction in dropout. Further, we find 
reductions in school non-enrollment rates amongst all ages, despite much of the literature 







Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are often heralded as the anti-poverty 
model of choice for many nations. Since the late 1990s, these programs have witnessed an 
exponential uptake, with much of Latin America and the Caribbean implementing some form 
of CCT. The program is laid out as such: money is transferred to beneficiaries conditional 
upon their compliance with a set criterion of human-capital investments such as sending their 
children to school and attending regular health checkups. CCT’s help boost both short-term 
welfare by providing a means of income smoothing, along with long-term macro-level human 
capital accumulation by requiring investments in education and health. Research also 
indicates that they have had positive effects in the realm of health (Rasella, et al., 2013; Shei, 
2013; Paes-Sousa, et al., 2011), education (Glewwe, et al., 2012; De Brauw, et al., 2015; 
Schaffland, 2011), female empowerment (De Brauw, et al., 2014), and lowering crime (Chioda, 
et al., 2016; Loureiro, 2012; Alves, et al., 2019). This particular study aims to look at the 
educational effects of Bolsa Familia, the most extensive CCT program in the world.  
Bolsa Familia is currently the largest CCT program in the world, delivering monetary 
support to nearly 11.1 million families (over 46 million Brazilian citizens) with a budget of 
US$11.2 Billion (Cirkovic, 2019). It was founded in 2003 and originated as the composition 
of four transfer programs that each had their own emphasis (“promoting schooling, health 
care, compensating for fewer price subsidies or promoting food consumption”) but similar 
target populations (Lindert, et al., 2007, p.13). In hopes to expand Brazil’s social safety net 
and create a more efficient system, President Lula combined the four programs into what is 
now known as Bolsa Familia. At its genesis, it was aimed at impoverished families with 
children in the household. As of 2014, eligibility was determined by having children under 
the age of 17 and a monthly income of less than R$154 (see Appendix A for complete benefit 
timeline and Appendix B for an example of benefits received by a fictitious family). The 
transfer of the cash is contingent upon school attendance by each child in the household, with 
85% attendance expected for children between the ages of 6 and 15 and 75% attendance for 
children between 16 and 17.  
Furthermore, the benefit amount goes up with age, as it is believed that older children 
have a higher opportunity cost of being in school. Data on compliance is obtained from 
schools reporting to their local municipalities who then disclose the information to the 
Ministry of Social Development (MDS). The funds for the program are distributed via 
electronic benefit cards that are preferentially given to a female head-of-household. In 2007, 
it was estimated that “93% of legally responsible beneficiaries were women” (Lindert et al., 
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2007, p. 17). Our data reinforces this trend, finding that 94.21% of recipient households are 
female-headed. By providing cash transfers to a household contingent upon a minimum 
school attendance rate, it acts as an incentive to prioritize education. However, Bolsa Familia 
was not rolled out in a randomized fashion like Oportunidades (Mexico) and Bono de 
Desarollo Humano (Ecuador), which makes drawing conclusions on causality challenging. 
Further, many of the studies available have not had access to large-scale microdata, but 
rather, only one round of the National Household Survey (PNAD) from 2006, which included 
Bolsa Familia questions. Our study employs a never-before-used administrative dataset that 
spans four years and includes demographic information on both Bolsa Familia recipients and 
those who did not qualify for the program. With nearly 18.5 million observations we are able 
to garner precise estimates of the program’s impact.  
We first estimate the underlying relationship between Bolsa Familia and school 
enrollment by conducting a linear probability (LP) model with a vector of demographic 
controls and year and state fixed effects. We find that Bolsa Familia reduces a child’s risk of 
dropping out by nearly -11%, helping to keep approximately 60,627 children in school who 
would have otherwise dropped out. Once we establish a strong negative relationship between 
school dropout rate and Bolsa Familia, we utilize our next econometric model, a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity (RDD). This quasi-experimental approach assesses the differences 
in school enrollment for children belonging to families that receive Bolsa Familia benefits 
compared to children in families who do not. By limiting our average income window to those 
who fall within R$18 above and below the threshold, we can compare observations that 
should otherwise be statistically similar, with the only difference being Bolsa Familia 
enrollment. Therefore, if different school outcomes are observed between those right above 
the cutoff and those right below, we can confidently conclude the disparity is a result of the 
CCT program. The RDD results indicate that being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia 
reduces the risk of dropping out by -53%. The estimates are significant at the 1% level and 
are robust across a variety of tests. We conclude that Bolsa Familia is a highly effective 
program and is achieving its goal of bolstering human capital.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in that it employs a novel dataset that 
has never been used for academic research. To our knowledge, this is the first study of this 
magnitude to assess how Bolsa Familia influences school enrollment. Not only do we assess 
the overall impact of Bolsa Familia but we also examine the heterogeneity in results across 
different age groups. Most of the literature has pointed to older children realizing the benefits 
of CCT programs, with little impact amongst primary schoolers. Our results diverge from 
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the literature in that we see meaningful reductions in dropout rates amongst all ages, with 
Bolsa Familia leading to nearly a -55% reduction for primary schoolers, and a -35% reduction 
for high schoolers. Witnessing meaningful reductions across all age groups reinforces the 
utilization of CCT’s as means in which to build up a nation’s human capital.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of 
the literature, Section 3 introduces the data and key variables, Section 4 highlights the 
econometric models used, Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 discusses 
the implications of this study and ideas for future research.  
 
2 Literature Review  
2.1 Macroeconomic ideas of education  
To fully understand the theory backing CCT’s, we must revert to the foundational 
macroeconomic literature, which helps explain why it would be in the interest of a nation-
state to invest in education. Within the field, there is a consensus that increased schooling 
has positive effects on sustainable economic development through various channels. 
Emerging in the late 1980s, endogenous growth theory posits that investment in human 
capital is an essential factor in development and improving the standard of living. As its name 
suggests, endogenous growth contends that economic growth occurs within the system 
rather than through exogenous forces, which was in direct contrast to previous neoclassical 
thought that considered external factors as a predictor for growth. For instance, neoclassical 
theory postulated that innovation was exogenous while, in endogenous growth theory, 
innovation was dependent upon the stock of knowledge present within the country, and the 
R&D required to bolster it (Romer, 1986). 
Unlike the Solow model, endogenous growth theory posits that innovation is 
endogenous and dependent upon the stock of knowledge (Romer, 1986). Therefore, we can 
use policy intervention to increase investment in human capital and research to alter the long-
run growth rates of a country. This model was undoubtedly in the minds of many 
policymakers and scientists responsible for the influx of CCT programs in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, as it required massive investments in education and health, two primary 
components of human capital. 
Another way in which education can lead to growth is through the spillover effects it 
ushers in (Nelson & Phelps, 1966). Endogenous growth theory also recognizes this channel 
and emphasizes how investment in human capital and R&D can affect a country’s ability to 
capitalize on positive externalities and spillover effects or its absorptive capacity (i.e., it must 
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have some baseline human capital stock to benefit from imitative behavior). More technology 
will be implemented and diffused into society as education increases and it is dependent upon 
the gap between the theoretical stock of technology and the actual level of technology being 
used in production (Nelson & Phelps, 1966). Not only will the individuals who receive the 
education benefit, but also those who do not will reap the externality of being able to imitate 
the techniques tested by others.  Macro-level models not only highlight the individual 
benefits of schooling but also the societal advantages of having an educated populous.  
 
2.2 Underinvestment in education	
If education plays a role in bolstering country-level growth, and creating positive 
spillover effects, then why is there such underinvestment in school and a mismatch of the 
perceived value between households and the government? One possible explanation is that 
education takes on a quasi-public good form due to the externalities it produces. While 
education may not always be a perfect fit into the public good typology (non-rivalrous 
consumption, and non-excludability), general knowledge falls into this category, something 
that education produces (Stiglitz, 1999). Schooling directly benefits the individual receiving 
it via an increase in their lifetime earnings, better health, and marriage market outcomes 
(Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011). But it also can spillover to others through promoting a stable 
and democratic environment, increased human rights, more social cohesion, less crime, and 
the spread of new technology (Glaeser, et al., 2007; Grossman, 2006; Becker & Lewis, 1973; 
Dee, 2004). In taking the difference between these private and public benefits, it is easy to 
conceptualize that the cumulative positive externalities generated by schooling are vast and 
may exceed the private benefits, which firmly cement it into the realm of a quasi-public good. 
Unfortunately, a common feature among public goods is their under-provision due to the 
non-internalization of the positive externalities. A mismatch is created between the private 
and social optimum because the market does not allow the individual who received the 
schooling to realize the external benefits it reaped on others. This is especially true in 
communities where there may not be labor market opportunities that reward more schooling, 
making the returns to education very low, further exacerbating its under-investment. 
This disparity between the private and social optima leads to a coordination failure, 
which is often thought of at a macro level. However, we can redefine coordination failures to 
be household-specific, where the price of school exceeds the utility derived from it. These 
coordination failures can result in one or more Nash equilibria that are not Pareto optimal, 
such as a family not sending their child to school and their neighbors also not doing so. The 
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primary problem is then how to move from this point to a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium 
in the face of coordination failure. It is, therefore, necessary that we have some sort of 
mechanism that corrects the private undervaluation of education. 
 
2.3 Theory of the conditional cash transfer  
The conditional cash transfer (CCT) is one such way of correcting for these market 
failures. Through a cash incentive, households are induced to adjust their behavior to the 
social optimum. Essentially, the transfer acts as a price effect on the action of schooling. 
Rather than the typical notion of a price effect, which assesses how market prices influence 
demand for a product, the cash transfer encourages an increase in the supply of an action (De 
Janvry & Sadoulet, 2005). The increase in the price for the action is a mechanism that helps 
reward the household for the externalities of education that are not captured by market forces 
due to its quasi-public-good structure. CCT’s should be viewed as a contract between 
households conditional upon the delivery of an action (school), which bridges the social and 
private optimum.  
This opportunity cost of attending school can also help explain why we witness such 
disparities in school enrollment for older versus younger children. If the fallback option is 
outside work or production within the household, then younger children would have a very 
low opportunity cost because the child’s potential income stream would be minimal. 
Therefore, delayed enrollment would be non-optimal. Older children would have a higher 
opportunity cost because their outside options increase (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2005). 
Further, even if their labor market alternatives are seldom, they are often kept home to 
supervise younger siblings who are not of school age. This helps explain why we often see an 
increase in transfer size as children get older.  
There is no doubt that education plays a crucial role in sustainable economic 
development by enhancing human capital accumulation. Policymakers are well aware of the 
benefits that education reaps in on individuals and the general population. However, despite 
its positive spillovers, we see widespread underinvestment in education. The reasoning for 
this is that it takes on a quasi-public good nature and does not allow individuals to internalize 
the positive externalities it produces (Anttila-Hughes, 2020). This creates a mismatch 
between the private and public valuation of school and explains why we see such educational 
disparities around the globe. With this in mind, many policymakers have cultivated 
innovative solutions to bridge the gap in valuation. One such method has been CCTs. The 
transfer acts as a price effect on the action of attending school and raises the individual utility 
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garnered from education. This mechanism corrects for the misaligned social and private 
optima. Not only has its effects been discussed in much of the theory literature, but it has also 
been evaluated in rigorous empirical studies. 
2.4 Applied research on CCT’s and education in Latin America  
When studying Bolsa Familia, it is important to observe the educational outcomes 
found in neighboring nations with similar initiatives. To begin, arguably, one of the most 
widely examined CCT programs is Progresa (currently Prospera), which was rolled out in 
Mexico in 1997. Progresa is often the blueprint used for other CCT’s implemented across 
Latin America. Progresa is considered a CCT program that offers families below a specific 
income threshold grants contingent upon them keeping their children in school for 85% of 
the school year. Like many other CCT’s the grant size varies based on particular child 
characteristics, as the opportunity cost of keeping children in school differs with their age 
and gender. What makes this governmental program unique is its implementation. To ensure 
accurate impact evaluations, the program was randomly enacted in 314 of the 495 localities 
during the first two years, with the remaining locations receiving the program in the third 
year. This allowed evaluations of the program to take a quasi-experimental approach. Taking 
advantage of this exogeneity, Schultz (2004) conducted a study aimed at evaluating if school 
enrollment rates were statistically different between control villages and treatment villages. 
The authors found a 0.66 difference or about two-thirds of a year increase in children who 
were recipients of the grant than children who had not yet received funding. While the short-
term impacts of Progresa seem to be effective, other studies have attempted to see if the 
results are upheld over a longer span of time. One study found that after five-and-a-half years 
of receiving benefits, there is still a positive effect on school attainment (Behrman, Parker, & 
Todd 2011). Mexico’s success with Progresa undoubtedly encouraged other countries to 
deploy similar programs in an attempt to boost their own stock of human capital.  
Brazil has also witnessed successful educational outcomes for families enrolled in the 
short-run and long-run. A paper by Schaffland (2011) utilized data from the 2006 PNAD (the 
National Household Survey) and employed a propensity score methodology which matches 
two individuals, one that is enrolled, and the other not enrolled, but both with the same 
probability of being in the program, conditional on certain observable characteristics (income 
variables, characteristics of the child, characteristics of the household head, etc.). By using 
this approach, the authors determine children predicted to be enrolled in BFP had an increase 
in school enrollment of 4-5%. However, this result appears to become weaker as time goes 
on, with school enrollment rates falling by 1.18% over time. Though, the overall impact of 
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Bolsa Familia on schooling remains positive throughout time, reinforcing the literature that 
posits the long-term success of CCT’s.  
Another heavily studied CCT, Familias en Acción (FA), was enacted in 2001 in 
Colombia. To improve child nutrition, school enrollment, and household consumption, 
eligibility was determined by falling beneath a certain income threshold and contingent upon 
keeping children in school for 80% of the school year and attending regular growth and 
development check-ups. Like many other programs, including Bolsa Familia, the grant given 
to families increased as children got older. To examine the causal effect on school attendance, 
Attanasio et al. (2005) collected data from household surveys conducted across municipalities 
that received FA funding and municipalities that did not. In order to perform a difference-in-
difference approach, the authors selected municipalities that were extremely similar in socio-
demographic, economic, population, and urbanization realms but only differed in having 
access to a bank (the reason for FA not being present). The results indicate that FA did not 
significantly change enrollment rates for children in grades 8-11 but had a significant 
difference in enrollment for children aged 12-17. Confirming their hypothesis that the cash 
transfer can help increase the utility derived from schooling, correcting for the private 
undervaluation of education.  
Bolsa Familia has also shown similar results in the program being more effective for 
older children. De Brauw et al. (2015) assessed 11,000 households, with some enrolled in 
Bolsa Familia and others not. The authors implement a propensity-score weighted regression 
to assess differences in schooling for urban vs. rural and older vs. younger children. Similar 
to the prior study, they uncover that the largest positive impacts on schooling are seen by 
older children aged 15-17, perpetuating the theory that opportunity cost increases with age. 
Thus, the cash transfer will largely change the behavior of older children who would have 
dropped out of school without the transfer, while younger children would remain in school 
with or without it.  
Many Latin American countries have experienced increased human capital as a result 
of their CCT’s. Even though the educational outcomes may show a greater level of 
significance in the short- run than the long-run and for older rather than younger children, 
there is certainly an overarching consensus of the positive effects that CCT’s exhibit.  
3. Data and Measurement of Variables 
To apply for Bolsa Familia, families must be registered within the Cadastro Unico 
system (CADUNICO), a central database that determines eligibility for nearly twenty-five 
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transfer programs in addition to Bolsa Familia. Thus, the registry contains information on 
those who qualified for Bolsa Familia and those who were just above the income threshold. 
The formulation of the registry was initially constructed to streamline targeting of 
beneficiaries, prevent duplication of benefits, and reduce administrative costs. Each of the 
5,564 municipalities is responsible for registering families into the database and conducting 
interviews that garner information on household composition, income level, and other 
demographic features (Lindert et al., 2007). All beneficiaries are required to complete the 
survey every two years in order to continue to receive transfers. Our study utilizes the 
administrative data from CADUNICO for its analysis and takes advantage of its panel data 
structure. This dataset has never been used for academic research and its purpose was solely 
for administrative tracking. The magnitude of this dataset is unprecedented regarding public 
information available on Bolsa Familia, making this study one of a kind. Overall, the dataset 
contains nearly 1.2 billion observations that include every single Bolsa Familia payment 
made. However, for our analysis, we collapse the payment data to a measure of yearly 
enrollment and limit our period of interest to 2014-2017. We end up with a sample of 
approximately 60,452,388 observations. It is comprised of demographic information and 
household composition features that were gathered at the time of the survey. Table 1 provides 
an overview of demographic characteristics categorized by Bolsa Familia enrollment. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable (%) Total Sample BFP Recipients Non-BFP Recipients 
Average income 146.25 70.47 285.21 
Female 57.84 60.79 39.21 
Age 27.66 25.25 30.77 
Literate 81.64% 81.59% 81.95% 
Female household head 92.69% 94.21% 89.53% 
Household size 3.13 3.38 2.68 
Household head literate 89.03% 89.67% 87.70% 
 
 
The educational outcomes captured in the dataset include a question asked of whether 
each member of the household “goes to school currently,” with the responses ranging from 
“yes,” “no, but has gone in the past” and “never went to school.” We define our measurement 
of not in school as children over the age of 7 and under the age of 17 who have reported “never 
went to school” and “no but has gone in the past.” In Brazil, children must be enrolled in 
school by the age of seven, however, guardians are encouraged to enroll their children 
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starting at six years old (UNESCO, 2020). This is why we chose to include children seven 
years and older in our sample. ‘Not in school’ is the primary outcome variable utilized in the 
empirical models. Table 2 provides an overview of school enrollment rates conditional on 
particular qualities.  
 
Table 2: School enrollment  
 
 Not in school 95% Confidence interval 
Variable Percent Lower bound Upper bound 
Total not in school 3.63 3.62 6.63 
Not in school by age    
     Primary School Age  6.90 6.88 6.92 
     Lower secondary school age 1.14 1.13 1.15 
     Upper secondary school age 3.37 3.35 3.38 
Not in school by gender    
     Female 3.70 3.69 3.71 
     Male 3.55 3.54 3.57 
Not in school by BFP participation    
     Not enrolled  







     Currently and previously enrolled 
Under 10  
     Not enrolled  
     Currently enrolled  
     Currently and previously enrolled 
Between 10-13  
     Not enrolled      
     Currently enrolled  
     Currently and previously enrolled 
Over 13  
     Not enrolled 
     Currently enrolled 









































At first glance, we do see a difference in school rates for recipients versus non-
recipients. Children who do not belong to families that receive benefits are out of school at 
slightly higher rates (3.35%) than children belonging to beneficiary families (2.97%). Further, 
we investigate whether being enrolled for two consecutive terms makes a difference. By 
restricting our sample to include those were enrolled in the last period of observation, we see 
that children belonging to this category have the lowest rate of not being in school (2.50%). 
This could be attributed a learning mechanism, where families that have been in the program 
in a prior period are more aware of the program stipulations or have successfully altered their 
behavior more so than households that have only been enrolled for one period.  
 11 
Table 2 also reveals that the highest rates of school non-enrollment are amongst 
primary-aged children (6.90%). We speculate that this is because there is a lag in the time it 
takes families to enroll their young children into the school system. Lower secondary school 
age is when most children are enrolled in school, but once they reach upper secondary school, 
the unenrollment rates begin to climb again. Figure 1 summarizes the average number of 
children reported as not being in school, plotted against age. It is divided by program 
participation highlighting the differentials between children belonging to families who 
received Bolsa Familia transfers and families who did not. 
 





















Initially, we do see that individuals who belong to families that are not enrolled in 
Bolsa Familia are out of school at the highest rates. Further, we witness that those who are 
currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia and were enrolled in the last unit of observation have the 
highest school enrollment averages amongst all ages. Prior to running any econometric 
models, the raw data does point to an interesting pattern.  
Next, our treatment variable is enrollment in Bolsa Familia. The measure was 
constructed by observing monthly payment data. We created a binary indicator variable that 
was 1 if the individual received a transfer. If the individual never received a transfer, it was 0. 
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There was often the case where the transfer would stop and later resume. When this occurred, 
we continued to mark that individual as enrolled. In our LP and RDD model, we use a 
contemporaneous measure of Bolsa Familia enrollment. What this means is that the 
individual was reported as enrolled at the time we observe their school outcomes. Our 
primary model utilizes contemporaneous enrollment, as the threshold is much more 
pronounced and exhibited a stronger first-stage result than using the lagged version 
(discussed in greater detail in section 4.2Table 3 highlights basic Bolsa Familia enrollment 
statistics.   
 
Table 3: Bolsa Familia Enrollment Statistics  
 
 Frequency Percent 
Enrolled in BFP 40,852,018 67.58 
Not enrolled in BFP 







The average income variable has been calculated by the Brazilian government based on the 
income composition features reported in the CADUNICO filing such as income from work, 
unemployment benefits, child support, donations, etc. The final calculated number is what is used 
to determine if an individual is eligible for the program. We utilize the average income variable in our 
RDD approach to help predict enrollment. The maximum per capita monthly household income 
threshold has changed numerous times throughout the years. In 2014, it increased from R$140 to 
R$154, and in 2016 it increased to R$170 (see Appendix A for complete benefit timeline and 
Appendix C for a graphical representation of the changing threshold). We also construct a binary 
measurement that captures whether the individual’s average income fell above or below the 
threshold in the year in which they applied for the program. This is an additional variable that we 
employ to predict Bolsa Familia enrollment in the first stage of our RDD.  
 
4. Empirical Model and Hypotheses 
4.1 Linear Probability Model  
Before moving into the primary identification strategy of an RDD, it is important to 
establish the relationships between our variables of interest. Firstly, we restrict the sample 
to include only the conditional portion of Bolsa Familia. Being a linear probability (LP) 
model, the outcome variable is a binary indicator of whether a child is currently not in school 
and the independent variable of interest is Bolsa Familia enrollment. The LP model allows 
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us to estimate the probability of !!  (not being in school) occurring, given, "! (being enrolled 
in Bolsa Familia and our control variables). Thus, the two outcomes represent the event 
occurring #! = !! = 1, or not occurring(1 − #!) = !! = 0 . The model takes the form of: 
*(!!|"!) = #! = , + ∑/""! , where # is the probability that the child will not be in school.  
Additional control variables incorporated in the model include age, gender (1=female, 
0=male), and average income in logarithmic form. These aspects are incorporated into the 
model because much research points to the increasing opportunity cost of schooling for older 
children and females (De Brauw et al., 2015, De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2015; Emerson & Souza, 
2007; Duryea, et al., 2007). By including these in our model, we will be able to determine if it 
is an influencing factor. Finally, average income is utilized as a control because it influences 
both Bolsa Familia enrollment and school outcomes; thus, omitting it would create biased 
results. 
 
The model is as follows  
!! = #" +	##&# + #$'() +	#%()*+), + #&'-),'()	.*/01) + 	2' + 3( +	 	4! 	 
 
The Y variable comprises of the following measure:  
• Not in school: children between the ages of 7 to 17, who reported “never went to school” 
and “no but have gone in the past”. It is coded as a “1” if they are not in school, and a 
“0” if they are in school. 
 
The  "# variable comprises of the following measures  
• Currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia: the contemporaneous measure of enrollment. 
Meaning, the unit was enrolled at the time we are checking the ‘not in school’ 
measure.  
 
We also include a full set of state, 	2' ,and year, 3( , fixed effects in all models. The 
reasoning for including fixed effects is to eradicate any unobserved cross-sectional 
heterogeneity. By taking the average of each individual over time and subtracting it from the 
level each period, the omitted variation across groups has been ‘fixed,’ which removes the 
unobserved heterogeneity between cross-sections, leaving us with within-state and year 
variation, allowing for better identification of causal relationships. In total, we control for a 
total of 26 states and four years.  
(1) 
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A fixed-effect method was chosen over random effects because the assumptions are a 
bit laxer, allowing for covariance between the time-invariant portion of the error and our 
regressors. To confirm this choice, we employ a Hausman test to ensure we are using the 
most efficient estimator. We reject the null, meaning the difference in coefficients is 
systematic, and the covariance is not equal to zero. The use of random effects would be biased, 
making fixed effects the most appropriate model.  
Finally, we cluster our standard errors,	1$ 	, by state. This adjustment helps correct if 
school dropout rates are not uniformly distributed within each state (i.e.: observations are 
correlated to each other within each group). We believe this is a likely scenario as factors 
such as education policy are decided at the state level in Brazil.  
 
4.2 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity    
A fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) is employed to uncover the causal 
relationship between Bolsa Familia participation and educational outcomes. This 
methodology requires us to have exact knowledge of the conditions that lead to treatment 
and a large sample size that includes participants and non-participants. The clear income 
threshold for Bolsa Familia and our extensive dataset allows us to observe the outcomes of 
those gathered right above and below the income cutoff. Our sample is restricted to the 
conditional portion of the program and households with children and adolescents under the 
age of seventeen. By analyzing households that fall within a very narrow window of monthly 
income, we assume that they are statistically similar, with the only significant difference 
being one receiving treatment (enrollment in Bolsa Familia) and the other being left 
untreated (not enrolled in Bolsa Familia). To ensure the statistical similarity, we determine 
an optimal window of analysis by generating a variety of data-driven bandwidth estimators  
and select the one that gives us the largest range. We settle on a symmetric bandwidth of [-
18, 18].  
An RDD design is an excellent methodology when you have a sharp cutoff between 
treated and untreated, and there is total compliance on each side. However, because the 
demographic information obtained is self-reported, there are likely households in the 
untreated category receiving benefits and eligible families not receiving benefits. This could 
be due to erroneous reporting on the civilian or governmental side. The mix around the 
threshold requires us to implement an identification strategy that accounts for endogeneity 
issues of partial compliance. An RDD allows for a cutoff point that is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. There still needs to be a discontinuity at the threshold, but it does not need to 
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show perfect compliance.  Figure 2 depicts the discontinuity between whether a family 
received a transfer and their income relative to the qualification criteria in the year in which 
they applied.  
 




















As suspected, Figure 2 indicates a jump in the probability of receiving Bolsa Familia 
payments at the income threshold. Those that fall above it are much more likely to be non-
recipients, and those that fall below it appear more likely to receive benefits. Thus, we 
implement an instrumental variable technique that isolates the treatment effect on 
the compliers, or those who properly qualify and receive Bolsa Familia. Enrollment is 
instrumented by average income and being below the threshold. Average income is a metric 
calculated by the Brazilian government and includes various components reported by families 
in their CADUNICO filing. It is an extremely complex measure to recreate, and all of our 
attempts to backward engineer it failed. Because of this, we believe that it would 
be very difficult for an applicant to know how to manipulate their answers to achieve an 
average income that falls right below the threshold. Furthermore, the constantly changing 
income criteria and extension rules would make it difficult for an applicant to anticipate future 
cutoff values (see Appendix A for a complete timeline of threshold values). Therefore, we 


















income to predict enrollment, meaning the most recently reported average income, as this 
produced the largest discontinuity or best prediction of actually being enrolled. We did 
explore the option of using a lagged version of income, meaning the unit’s average income 
that was reported in the previous period. However, when establishing the initial 
discontinuity, it was much weaker than the contemporaneous measure. Figure 3 depicts the 
lagged versus contemporaneous discontinuities.   
 
 















Figure 3 illustrates that the contemporaneous measure is much better at predicting 
enrollment, justifying our use of it in the model.  
We use a fuzzy RDD design in which enrollment is instrumented by a family’s 
calculated monthly average income relative to the threshed in the year they applied, a binary 
measure of being above or below the cutoff, and an interaction term.  The average income is 
centered on zero, with a bandwidth of [-18,18]. We also include year and state fixed effects 
in all models, helping to eradicate any unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. The model 














!$ = /% +	/#<H$ +	I#"$ + 1$ 
 
The <$ variable comprises of the following measure:  
• Enrollment: if a family was enrolled between 2014 through 2017. Coded as “1” if yes, 
and coded as “0” if no.  
 
The >$ variable comprises of the following measures  
• Centered average income: Average income is centered on the threshold in the year in 
which they filed. It is restricted to 18 above the threshold and 18 below the threshold.   
• Below Threshold: a binary variable that indicates whether the family’s average income 
fell below the threshold in the year in which they applied.  It is coded as a “1” if they 
are below the threshold, and a “0” if they are above. 
• Interaction: An interaction term between the centered average income and the binary 
indicator of being below the threshold.  
 
The !$ variable comprises of the following measure:  
• Not in school: children between the ages of 7 to 17, who reported “never went to school” 
and “no but have gone in the past”. It is coded as a “1” if they are not in school, and a 
“0” if they are in school. 
 
The "$ covariate is the year and state fixed effects.  
• The year fixed effects include 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. We control for 26 states. 
 
In the first stage, we define >$		as an instrument for <$ . The variable, >$ , indicates whether 
the household is eligible by using their centered monthly per capita income in the year of 




the two. Once we obtain our first stage estimate, we run the second stage which utilizes our 
estimated <H$ that predicts whether a household has been treated. The parameter of interest is 
/#  and captures the effect of the Bolsa Familia on educational outcomes. We also utilize 
triangular kernel weighting. This simply applies higher weights to the observations that are 
closer to the income threshold, eliminating bias that stems from using data further away from 
the cutoff point.  
The effect uncovered will be the local average treatment effect (LATE). It isolates the 
average impact of the treatment on the compliers or the average educational effect on the 
individuals who qualified and received Bolsa Familia. It is derived by dividing the jump in the 
regression of not being in school on the covariate to the jump in the regression of enrollment 
on the covariate:  
M = 	
D3N'↑)*[!$ = 1|>$ = P] − D3N'↓)*[!$ = 1|>$ = P]
D3N'↑)*[<$ = 1|>$ = P] − D3N'↓)*[<$ = 1|>$ = P]
 
 
Where the numerator is the difference in school outcomes (!$)		for those with incomes right 
below and right above the threshold (>$), and the denominator is the difference in the 
enrollment (<$) for those with incomes right below and right above the threshold (>$).    
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Linear Probability Model  
 Table 4 column (1) shows the LP regression results for Bolsa Familia’s impact on 
school enrollment. It illustrates how contemporaneous enrollment (being currently enrolled) 
in Bolsa Familia influences a child's risk of not being in school. The initial regression results 
show a clear negative relationship between school dropout and being enrolled in Bolsa 
Familia. In the model, the coefficient of our measures of enrollment was significantly different 
from 0 at the 1% level. They moved in the opposite direction of our school outcome variable, 
meaning that children in recipient families are more likely to be in school than children 









Table 4: Linear probability regression with controls and state and year fixed effects  
 
Dependent Variable: Not in school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     




























Observations 17,322,182 17,322,182 17,322,182 15,854,703 
R-squared 
Dependent variable mean  
0.0031 
0.0308 






(Clustered Standard Error in Parentheses) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
While the magnitude of the coefficients seems small, they do make a sizable difference 
due to our sample size of nearly 17 million and the low baseline percentage of children out of 
school. For instance, in Table 4, we see that being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia 
decreases a child’s risk of dropping out by -0.35 percentage points. The baseline number of 
children not in school for this sample is 3.08 percent, so a -0.35 percentage point difference 
translates to nearly an -11% decrease. This means that being currently enrolled in Bolsa 
Familia is helping to keep nearly 60,627 children in school who would have otherwise 
dropped out.  
Once we incrementally add controls, the results hold up and remain consistently 
negative and extremely similar in magnitude. For instance, in column (4) on Table 4, the 
probability of a child dropping out of school holding all other factors constant is -0.34 
percentage points lower for current enrollees. The consistency and statistical significance of 
our estimates indicate the validity of our initial LP results. 
An important aspect in the literature of CCT’s is the impact that age has on school 
outcomes. To investigate this further, we run all fixed effect regressions with age categories, 
divided by primary age, lower secondary, and upper secondary. Tables 5 highlights these 
outcomes. The estimate that is the largest in magnitude and significance is for primary-aged 
children. For instance, a child under 10 belonging to a household currently receiving benefits 
is -0.86 percentage points less likely to not be in school. According to this estimate, current 
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enrollment in Bolsa Familia is helping to keep about 37,000 children under the age of 10 in 
school. For lower secondary school, Bolsa Familia decreases the likelihood of dropping out 
by -0.45.  However, for high schoolers, we see differing results. The percentage point impact 
diminishes significantly to -0.08 percentage points, meaning that Bolsa Familia is only 
changing the school behavior of around 6,579 children over the age of 13, despite having a 
total of 285,345 children out of school within this age range. These results are surprising in 
that they indicate that Bolsa Familia encourages the largest enrollment shifts among the 
youngest children. Much of the literature has contended that we witness the biggest gains in 
school attendance for older children when it comes CCTs. Our basic LP model reveals a 
different story. However, it is important to note that despite including several controls and 
fixed effects, we still face issues of endogeneity and bias. There are likely important 
confounding and unobserved features within the data. To eradicate this, we move to our next 
identification strategy, a fuzzy regression discontinuity.  
 
 
Table 5: Linear probability regression by age category with state and year fixed effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Not in school 






years old   
Over 13 
years old 




















Dependent variable mean  0.0484 0.0084 0.0347 
(Clustered standard errors in parentheses) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
5.3 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Results  
Table 6 shows the fuzzy RDD results where contemporaneous Bolsa Familia 
enrollment is instrumented. The sample observed is 7-17-year-old children, that belong to 
households whose monthly income falls between R$18 above or below the threshold. While 
our basic OLS models had around 17 million observations, this bandwidth narrows down our 
observations to just above 950,000. The first stage results are extremely strong, with our 
binary indicator of being below the threshold highly predictive of Bolsa Familia enrollment, 
almost a 30-percentage point increase. Income centered on zero is a measure where the Bolsa 
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Familia threshold is centered on zero, being below zero means you have an income that 
qualifies enrollment, and being above zero means your income is too large and you do not 
qualify. Therefore, our negative coefficient on income centered on zero aligns with what we 
would expect, individuals whose average monthly income falls below the threshold are more 
likely to be enrolled. Our first stage f-statistic is 14,830. Rule of thumb contends that a valid 
first stage should have an f-statistic above 10. Figure 2 also visually reinforces the validity of 
a clear program discontinuity, predicted by falling above or below the threshold. These 
indicators leave us confident about our first stage and subsequent results.  
The second stage outcome does indicate that current Bolsa Familia enrollment 
significantly decreases the probability of a child not being in school. Our coefficient indicates 
that there is about a -1.7 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of dropping out. While 
the coefficient may appear small in magnitude, it translates to nearly a -53% decrease in the 
risk of not being enrolled in school.  
 






















First Stage: Contemporaneous enrollment 
Below threshold 0.2992*** 
(0.0025) 












Second stage: Not in school 
 




Income centered on zero -0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
Interaction  0.0002 
(0.0001) 
Constant  0.0350*** 
(0.0021) 
Dependent variable mean 
    Above threshold 






Within our narrow bandwidth of R$18 above and below the threshold, we estimate 
that being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia is responsible for keeping approximately 
16,218 children in school who would have otherwise dropped out. While our results only 
measure local average treatment, if we were to apply the percentage decrease to the total 
sample, it would translate to nearly 294,478 children remaining in school. However, this 
calculation is likely an underestimate, as our RDD sample was restricted to Bolsa Familia 
recipients who had the highest income. As we move further away from the threshold, it is 
likely the transfers change behavior even more drastically, greatly reducing the risk of 
dropping out.  
Graphically, we do see a discontinuity at the threshold of the percentage of children 
not in school. Figure 4 plots out the residual estimates of those not in school by Bolsa Familia 
enrollment using a linear fit. For those under the threshold, there appears to be a fairly flat 
line which jumps at the threshold and begins on an upward slope. Figure 5 utilizes the same 
data, only we employ a local polynomial fit.  
 





































In our basic LP model, we found an interesting pattern regarding age. It was observed 
that Bolsa Familia had a large influence on bolstering school enrollment for primary-aged 
children. With this in mind, we divided our RDD into the same age buckets as the LP model: 
under 10 years, 10 to 13 years, and 13 years and older. The output can be found in Table 7. 
Surprisingly, our results diverge from the LP model, in that Bolsa Familia enrollment seems 
to have quantitative and qualitative significance amongst all ages. We see meaningful 
reductions for primary, middle, and high school-aged children. For the youngest children, 
being currently enrolled in Bolsa Familia reduces the risk of not being in school by -2.69 
percentage points or nearly -55%. For the oldest children, we see a reduction of -1.27 
percentage points or about -35%. For middle-schoolers, the results are a bit more complex. 
Children between the ages of 10-13 are out of school at the lowest rates, so any gain from 
Bolsa Familia makes a sizable impact. Our findings are very interesting since much of the 
literature only points to seeing enrollment gains amongst high schoolers. However, we 
witness meaningful reductions in school non-enrollment for each age category.  
Table 7: Fuzzy regression discontinuity by age category with state and year fixed effects  
 
To further investigate the effect of age, we reran our RDD model for each individual 
age, as seen in Table 8.  
 
























Over 13 years 
First Stage for contemporaneous enrollment 
Below threshold 0.2975*** 0.2973*** 0.3005*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0035) 



























Second stage: Not in school 
























Dependent variable mean 
    Above threshold 










Robust standard errors in parentheses 









Age 7 -0.0340 
(0.0211) 
63,865 
Age 8 -0.0232  
(0.0154) 
70,258 
Age 9 -0.0175**  
(0.0085) 
74,799 
Age 10 -0.0137* 
(0.0074) 
80,006 
Age 11 -0.0066  
(0.0063) 
86,587 
Age 12 -0.0089  
(0.0060) 
89,473 























Table 8 illustrates the second stage of our RDD model. Ages 13, 14, 15, and 16 seem 
to have the most quantitative and qualitative significance. Meanwhile, Figure 6 plots the 
estimates found in the Table 8. Like the table, we see the largest reductions amongst primary 
and high school-aged children. However, it appears that the estimate is much nosier for 
primary-aged children, depicted by the wider confidence intervals. We see the smallest 
magnitude amongst middle-schoolers; however, this group is already out of school at the 
lowest rates. Our RDD results lead us to conclude that Bolsa Familia is effective for all ages, 
but especially children between the ages of 13 to 17. 
 



























5.3 Robustness Checks  
             To ensure our results are valid, we conduct several robustness checks. We assume 
that as we minimize the neighborhood and get closer to the threshold our estimated 
program effects should stay stable. However, to ensure this is the case we need to check 
that there are no signs of manipulation such as a large jump in observations right below the 
income cutoff. If we witness a large difference in the density of observations, it would 
indicate that recipients are able to successfully alter their reported monthly income to 
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receive benefits. To test this, we construct Figure 7, which was generated by artificially 
creating a 1,000 different threshold and conducting a test statistic (on the x-axis) that 
indicates if there is a significant difference in density above and below said threshold. Once 
mapped out, it should take the form of a normal distribution centered on zero. If there was 
absolutely no significant difference in density above and below the threshold, we would 
expect to see our true cutoff point centered on zero. In this case, our true threshold falls 
slightly below zero at about -0.25, however, it still does not indicate a significant difference 
in density above and below the threshold. Coupling this with the difficulty that it takes to 
backward engineer and predict the income qualification, we believe that there are little to 
no signs of manipulation. 
 

























Another common robustness check used in RDD analysis is estimating the model with 
different sized bandwidths. This checks the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative 
specifications. We rerun the total analysis with a bandwidth of [-24, 24] and [-12, 12]. Our 
original bandwidth of [-18, 18] indicated that Bolsa Familia reduces school dropout by -1.5 
percentage points. The larger bandwidth estimates a -1.49 reduction, and our smaller 
bandwidth estimates a -1.02 percentage point reduction. These estimates are similar in 
magnitude and remain significant at the p<0.05 level. Table 9 illustrates these findings.   
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Table 9: Fuzzy regression discontinuity with differing bandwidths 
 
 
Next, we implement a variety of fixed effects before settling on state and year. 
Originally, we ran all models with municipality fixed effects. The results from these 
estimations remained consistent once we changed to state-level, as this is the level at which 
educational policy is decided. Finally, we completed both our LP and RDD models with 
robust standard errors, and then again with clustered standard errors. Again, this examines 
how sensitive our estimate is to different econometric specifications. In each analysis, our 
standard errors and coefficients remain extremely similar, and we do not lose significance or 




These results suggest that Bolsa Familia effectively lowers school dropout rates for 
program beneficiaries. We first utilized a LP model to establish a relationship between Bolsa 













First Stage: Contemporaneous enrollment 

































Second stage: Not in school 
























Dependent variable mean 
    Above threshold 










Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Familia reduces a child’s risk of dropping out by -0.35 percentage points, or -11%. Next, we 
employ a fuzzy RDD model which is more rigorous quasi-experimental approach that helps 
eradicate bias The fuzzy RDD amplified the probability LP results and finds that being 
enrolled in Bolsa Familia reduces the risk of not being in school by -1.7 percentage points or 
-53%. At its genesis, Bolsa Familia was created to boost human capital by incentivizing school 
enrollment through monetary transfers. Our study finds that the transfer is effective in 
helping children stay in school. We observe a narrow neighborhood of 18 above and 18 below 
the threshold and see a significant difference in school enrollment rates. By looking at 
individuals that make within R$36 of each other, we assume that they should be extremely 
comparable, with the only distinction being program enrollment. Therefore, the significant 
difference in school enrollment must be attributed to Bolsa Familia. 
Prior studies have had limited access to enrollment data, specifically only one round 
of the National Household Survey (PNAD). Our novel administrative dataset was 
reconstructed into a panel format, making it conducive for a quasi-experimental approach 
that uncovers the causal effects of Bolsa Familia. We see meaningful reductions in school 
non-enrollment for all ages. Previous literature on CCT’s has pointed to the strongest results 
amongst high school-aged children. However, our RDD analysis found that primary-aged 
children belonging to recipient families are -2.69 percentage points or -55% less likely to not 
be in school than their non-recipient counterparts. For high-schoolers, Bolsa Familia reduces 
their risk of dropout by -1.27 percentage points or -35%. These results are a major 
contribution to the literature, in that they point to the broad effectiveness of CCT programs. 
While this study examined the conditional threshold of Bolsa Familia, there is another 
extension of the program that remains unstudied, the unconditional portion. We determined 
that the conditions attached are effective in changing school attendance behavior, however, 
is the same true in the absence of conditions? Future areas of research that apply the same 
econometric approach but look at the extreme poverty line, where individuals with a monthly 
income below R$89 receive a fixed benefit, and those above receive a conditional benefit, 
would add an interesting dimension to the CCT literature. Given this novel administrative 
dataset and rigorous quasi-experimental approach, we confidently conclude that Bolsa 
Familia is extremely effective in lowering school dropout rates, and we provide a replicable 
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Income threshold is R$140 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$236 
Variable benefit for children 
0-14: R$32 
Variable benefit for children 
15-17: R$38 
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Income threshold is R$140 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$236 
Variable benefit for children 
0-14: R$32 
Variable benefit for children 
15-17: R$38 






Income threshold is R$120 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$54 







Income threshold is R$120 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$110 
Variable benefit for children 
0-15: R$20 





Income threshold is R$140 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$32 
Variable benefit for children 
0-15: R$22 






Income threshold is R$140 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$172 
Variable benefit for children 
0-15: R$32 






06/2012 12/2012 2013 2014 2018 
Income threshold is R$178 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$301 
Variable benefit for children 
0-14: R$41 
Variable benefit for children 
15-17: R$48 





Income threshold is R$154 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$259 
Variable benefit for children 
0-14: R$35 
Variable benefit for children 
15-17: R$42 





Income threshold is R$140 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$236 
Variable benefit for children 
0-14: R$32 
Variable benefit for children 
15-17: R$38 





Income threshold is R$140 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$236 
Variable benefit for children 
0-14: R$32 
Variable benefit for children 
15-17: R$38 





Bolsa Familia is created 
Income threshold is R$100 
Maximum variable  
benefit is R$45 















Total Benefit: R$30 
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Total Benefit: R$60  








Total Benefit: R$66  















































































School Outcome Measurements 
(!) 
• Not in school 
  
Bolsa Familia Enrollment 
Measurements ("!) 
 
• Enrolled in Bolsa Familia 










• Log average income 
 
 
